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Introduction
Time, as conditio humana, is a fundamental characteristic feature of the human state 
of being. It is one of the  basic,  best-known  and at the same time,  most enigmatic  
events of our life.  At first  sight it  may seem boring and unintristing,  yet  it  is  the 
experience whose mystery gets the philosphical tradition to make conceptual efforts 
again and again. From the beginning, the concept of time has been characterized by 
twofold optics, the reason of which is that „there is no spontaneous desire for time“1, 
says Ghislain Lafont, a French theologian of the 20th century. In fact, there is a kind 
of general  resistance to the reflection on the fundamental aspects of being from a 
human  dimension.  Thus,  whoever  wants  to  approach the  mystery of  time,  should 
consider the question whether the usual concept of time – which considers it obvious 
or a theoretical-speculative knowledge holding no importance to us – does not only 
refer to our inability to fit in time. 
Hermeneutic ways of approaching time
Seeing this difficulty, Martin Heidegger, one of the major philosophers of the 20th 
century, does not only propose to answer the content of the time-question,  but it also 
becomes important for him to work out a philosophical disposition which gives us 
access of experience  to time. This means the examination of the aspects, based on 
which  we  gain  experience  not  only  about  a  certain  thing,  but  also  about  our 
knowledge of the thing. Without this, there would be no possibility for us to form an 
idea of time itself. 
     The insight appearing in Heidegger’s destruction, later in Lafont’s symbol and in 
Ricoeur’s  metaphor suggests that not only time as such, but also the access to the 
time-phenomenon is a philosophical problem to solve. This is certainly not a new idea 
but  the  heritage  of  a  great  tradition,  since  Aristotle’s  time-apories in  Book  4  of 
Physics,  Augustinus’s  time-paradox in  Book  11  of  Confessiones and  Kant’s 
antinomy-theory in his Critique of Pure Reason have given good examples of raising 
this methodological issue. 
     As different as these viewpoints are, they share one thing in common, that is the 
critique of intuitionism considering time as a primal givenness. They recognize that 
the tasks we encounter when trying to make the time-problem accessible,  can’t be 
solved through contemplation or with the help of optics. These approaches express in 
different ways that time can’t be directly perceptible, so we have to find an indirect 
way in order to experience it:  „Die Zeitlichkeit – writes Heidegger – ist nie etwas, 
was in einer  überschwenglichen,  einer  geheimnisvollen Intuition zu schauen wäre, 
sondern sie erschlieβt sich nur in einer bestimmt gearteten begrifflichen Arbeit.”2 Paul 
Ricoeur  in his  literary work entitled  Temps et  récit  similarly thinks:  „C’ est  cette 
1 LAFONT 2004, 484.p.
2 HEIDEGGER1975, 465.p.
impossibilité  d’  une  phénoménologie  pure  du  temps  qu’il  faudra  démontrer”.3. 
According  to  Ricoeur,  this  would  be  an  intuitive  approach  to  the  time-structure, 
which, however, can’t be separated from the argumentative-hermeneutic process, with 
the help of which the phenomenological  thinking itself  also proposes to solve the 
mystery of time. The phenomenological process which wants to represent  time itself 
attempts the impossible. It can never be clearly described, because the meditation on 
time is inseparable from the presence of the discussion about it. In his methodological 
analyses discussing the as-structure of understanding, Heidegger also makes it clear 
that  the hermeneutic  viewpoint has great significance in experience:  we never see 
things in their own naked, objective truth, but always understand them as something 
(etwas als etwas).4 The elementary experience is not pure sight, either, but originally 
involves the interpretation-structure. Approaching something without the as-structure 
exactly  means  that  the  comprehensive  sight  is  missing  and I  have  misunderstood 
something. We may as well say that there is no experience without  language. In the 
same way,  the time-experience  also needs  interpretation  in  order  to present  itself, 
because it is never accessible without  a hermeneutic effort. The significance of the 
hermeneutic work exactly lies in the fact that the interpretation itself makes up the 
field in which the thing to be interpreted can appear. If time appears only through 
interpretation, we can say with good reason that it first becomes an experience in this 
appearance,  so  the  interpretation  is,  at  the  same  time,  the  experience  of  the 
interpreted. 
     Of course, Heidegger has no doubt that the phenomenality of time – presence 
itself: in the way of appearing or covering – makes any hermeneutic interpretation 
possible.  The  phenomenological  experience  lets  us  know  something  –  making  it 
possible for us to relate to time in a hermeneutic way – and gives us food for thought, 
but hermeneutics has to realize the exploring and interpreting of its sense. Thus, by 
the given experience and by what appears through the given, we mean something that 
we do not find ready and finished, but something that we must turn into the object of 
interpretation, and for the meaning we have to struggle with the help of phenomenon. 
To  sum up,  the  spoken  or  unspoken  hermeneutic  approaches  say  that  we  cannot 
observe time in itself. The phenomenological gist of this experience usually becomes 
accessible  only in  the  context  of  other  symbols.  We always  speak about  time  in 
connection with another, foremost question to be answered. As Ricoeur puts it: we 
learn  to  read  time  through  these  mediators  –  retrospectively:5 in  theology,  for 
example,  in  connection  with  eternity,  in  philosophy  in  connection  with  being  or 
another person. This hermeneutic work intends to open the horizon of meeting the 
temporality of our own existence.  In this  respect,  it  is  worth taking a look at  the 
important turning points, our time experience has gone through.
Metaphysical experience of time
Continental philosphy interpreting the first period of our time consciouness – in the 
major  commentators‘  view on this  topic (Cullmann,  Grondind,  Pöggeler)  – firmly 
believes that our thinking has to get free from the bonds of time. Time and historicity 
appear as difficulty or merely a negative which we should overcome. According to 
Heidegger,  in  this  negation  we  can  recognize  the  basic  movement  of  classical 
metaphysics. The conception goes back to the ancient times to Plato’s Timaios, where 
3 RICOEUR 1983-1985, I. 156.pp. 
4 HEIDEGGER 1993, 2001, 32.§.
5 RICOEUR 1983-1985,  I., 131.p. 
time  appears  as  „the  moving  picture  of  eternity“.6 This  interpretation  of  being, 
according to which time is just a sheer vision, the illusion of reality, has left its mark 
on Continental thinking. Plato’s turning to ideas, which involved the underrating of 
arising and passing things, has established a tradition. After this, the mainstream of 
philosophy did not attach real importance to time, what is more, interpreted it as an 
antipower. Time appeared as it had been in close connection with evil. 
     That is why, Greek philosophers approached time from the perspective of death 
and interpreted it as a loss of being.7 This metaphysical approach was able to build a 
world concept  based on transcendence which endowed death with  sense  and gave 
man the hope of immortality.8 After this, the optics of metaphysics totally ignored the 
positive features of time. This true not only for the „Platonic way“, but also for the 
thinkers who intended to speak about time and history, like Bonaventura or Hegel. 
Hegel  was the first  who reacted  in  an especially  sensitive way to  the changes  of 
history,  however,  kept on interpreting time from old concepts of the tradition.  He 
thought that the world of changes, that is, the limited historical temporal being is a 
„negativity“ whose meaning lies in ascending (Aufhebung) to the timeless, and the 
historical investigations only aim at enhancing the timeless validity. In this approach, 
the „place“ of the truth is the concept,  the field of logic interpreted as a timeless 
sphere compared to which the historical reality is just an „illusion“. 
     While  criticizing  the  speculative  needs  of  metaphysics,  which  attempts  to 
understand  everything  through  concepts,  Heidegger  protests  against  the  fact  that 
metaphysics as the theory of knowledge ignores the factical life, and fails to recognize 
its time-experience when considers the supreme being as a sphere beyond time which 
is accessible for temporal beings only through observing and thinking. The purpose of 
metaphysical knowing is the supra-temporal essence, the cognition of eternal ideas, 
whose  temporalizing  is  secondary.  In  Heidegger’s  opinion,  however,  such 
transcendentalism is  nothing more than escaping from our own temporality.  After 
Plato, Boethius and Eckhart master follow this way when they speak about exceeding 
time on the way of man’s perfection, and they only use space symbolism to express 
spiritual existence in a positive sense.9 While spatial parameters (depth and height, for 
example) were understood as the stages of human perfection, they considered time as 
an obstacle of spiritual existence rather than a possibility, since within the frames of 
such an interpretation, the spirit is only a subject to time and change when meeting or 
having lower energies. So, according to Heidegger, being without time-experince is 
„eternal presence“ (nunc stans). This metaphysical time concept, which determined 
Continental  time  consciousness  for  a  long  time,  and  which  Derrida  called  the 
metaphysics of presence (métaphysique de la présence), becomes a problem in the 
modern times.
     
The time-experience of life and existence philosophy
In fact, it is life and existence philosophy (Kirkegaard, Bergson, Dilthey) that begin to 
demolish the metaphysical  experience  of time by getting to the  liberation  of time 
(assertion) from the elimination of time (negation).
     Kirkegaard is the first who, taking time radically seriously, sees the tense duality 
of  finite  and infinite,  temporal  and  eternal  moving  towards  the  inner  structure  of 
human  existence.  While  the  metaphysical  tradition  puts  the  emphasis  on  the 
6 Timaiosz, 37d (PLATÓN 1984, 334. pp.) 
7 Phaidón, 64a, (PLATÓN 1984, 1032. pp.) 
8 HEIDEGGER  2001, 49.§, 288.p., See CSEJTEI 2001, 5.p.
9 See CULLMANN 2000, 48.p.
negativity of time-flow, and attempts to solve the problem of evil through time and 
finitude,  Kirkegaard finds another (Christological)  way to experience and interpret 
time. This approach does not consider time as a loss but a possibility of existence. 
According  to  Kirkegaard’s  hypothesis,  contrary  to  that  of  Schelling’s,  the  choice 
(faith or desparation) that determines the direction of existence does not occur in a 
pre-existent state but here and now, in the moment of existence. The crucial relation 
of man to eternity,  which means the basis  of his  existence,  goes through in time, 
providing  that  man  himself  is  the  synthesis  of  temporal  and  eternal.  Kirkegaard 
intends  to  „remove“  the  evil-concept  of  metaphysics  to  the  level  of  personal 
existence, and to emphasize the „reality of sin“ instead of the speculative „problem of 
evil“. By doing so, he wants to put emphasis on the importance of personal being, 
which is given to man only through choice. This way time relates to  choice rather 
than evil, making the positive symbolism of time accessible. Temporality is no longer 
just a negative quality of human being but it  is a possibility of choosing our own 
existence: a real principium individuationis. This approach, where time appears as the 
state of choice for the person, raises different question from the previous one: isn’t it 
man himself standing under the power and mercy of time who, contrary to evil, can 
cope with himself? Bergson, by elaborating the experienced time (temps vécu), which 
he  called  duration,  and  Dilthey,  with  his  thoughts  reflecting  on  historicity,  also 
determine the existential meaning of time, where the question of time includes the 
question of individuation, that is, the ability to become a subjectum. 
     The essence  of  the  existential  time-concepts  is  that  they give  a  constructive 
meaning to time, they no longer deny its importance, and pick the time phenomenon 
out  of  the neutral  field  of  metaphysics  showing its  natural  relation  to  choice  and 
freedom,  the  concept  of  individual  existence  and  subjectivity.  They  question  the 
epistemological subjectum-concept, and create the  existence-concept of subjectivity, 
where  the  subjectum no longer  takes  up  the  position  of  epistemology but  has  an 
existential importance, thus, instead of knowing, it serves bringing into being. The 
merit of the existential time-concepts is that they represent a way of thinking which 
goes  against  the  loss  of  subjectum.  They point  out  the  significance  of  individual 
existence, where time plays a crucial part in creating the subjectum. All this attached 
a positive sense to the finitude of human being,  so the temporal  aspect  no longer 
appears as just a negative quality but it can be recognized as a positive, constitutive 
onthological motif of our existence. At the same time, according to Heidegger, these 
concepts, which do nothing more than turning round the dominance of duality (time-
eternity),  gain validity only within the frames of metaphysical questioning, and by 
removing the emphasis from the Platonic timeless sphere to the temporal, they do not 
leave the field of metaphysics. Within the frames of this duality, however, upgrading 
time and emphasizing the importance of its individualizing role, involves the fact that 
they can do absolutely nothing with the relation of time to death, the Platonic, ancient 
thanatological dimension. 
Hermeneutic time-experience
Heidegger, followed Kant, points out that by the state of metaphysics we should mean 
the dichotomic structure of thinking. This, as well as in terms of time, means that 
there  are  two  opposing  perspectives  in  tradition  from  the  beginning. 
Terminologically,   we can call them  cosmological and psychological, or  objective 
and subjective concepts of time. While the former (Aristotle, Plato) determines the 
time  of  natural  processes  through  the  movements  in  the  universe,  the  latter 
(Augustinus,  Kirkegaard,  Bergson,  Dilthey)  deals  with  the  time  of  the  spirit.  In 
accordance  with  this,  the  classical  philosophy  asks  whether  time  is  objective  or 
subjective. This question, in Heidegger’s opinion, results in only alternative answers 
which are not able  to stop each other,  what is  more,  they tend to reproduce each 
other.10 It  is  all  the  same,  whether  we  want  to  approach  to  time  objectively  or 
subjectively,  because both leads to the objectivization of our time-experience, thus, 
we should see beyond  this traditional dichotomy instead. The essence of Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic disposition is  that it attempts to give such access to the time-experience 
in which the objective-subjective opposition seem to become insecure. The merit of 
this  critical  investigation  is  that  it  calls  for  a  kind  of  meta-attitude.  Since  the 
objective-subjective time, the dichotomy between the two or the dominance of one or 
the other only matters within the frames of metaphysics, neither the cosmological nor 
the psychological time-concept is able to break through the boundaries of this model. 
In  the  case  of  opposing  aspects,  where  the  inner  coherence  of  the  viewpoints  is 
inevitable,  we can take radical steps ahead only if we question the sources of the 
debate by showing  the common hypothesis of both viewpoints. We can go beyond 
the collision only with a critical  approach signifying the motivational basis of the 
viewpoints. Thus, the Heidegerian criticism is not an objection which moves within 
the metaphysical way of putting a question, or which denies or show counter proofs 
for the sake of a new solution but it focuses on the elaboration of a meta-viewpoint 
which has something important to say about the birth of  this questioning. So, this 
argumentation  does  not  reject  the  traditional  concept  but  shows  what  makes  it 
possible. It does not ask with which arguments this or that answer can be proved but 
on what conditions such problems can be born. With this, Heidegger changes the way 
in which the time-problem is formulated and answered. In this respect, man struggling 
in the net of alternatives can raise his time consciousness to an upper level not with 
the  alternatives  of  answers  but  with  the  help  of  questioning  the  motivations  and 
possibility-conditions of the dichotomic way which is so typical of metaphysics. We 
can argue endlessly for time being objective or subjective with simirarly  strong and 
convincing  arguments,  but  the  metaphysical  yes/no  question  can  only lead  to  the 
reduction  of  the  time-problem  rather  than  to  a  solution.  It  illustrates   the 
objectivization of time. 
     According to Heidegger, however, our thinking about time cannot follow the same 
way as how we create consciousness about objects. In this case we cannot think of 
anything object-like. Time analyses do not move within the object-subject frame. The 
Heideggerian  use  of  language  makes  it  avoidable  that  we  comprehend  the  time 
phenomenon as the counterpole of subjectum, some kind of objective time-flow. Time 
cannot appear in the form of an object-like conception, because it is not one of the 
objects but something that already operates in all object-experience. The task of the 
hermeneutic  approach  is  nothing  more  than  bringing  back  the  dimensions  that 
reflexion-philosophy  threw  away,  expanding  it  to  the  dimensions  which  have  to 
remain invisible in the perspective of reflexion-philosohy so that the philosophy about 
time, as the object of investigation can become possible. Heidegger’s fundamental 
understanding  is  that  the  hermeneutic  phenomenology  of  time  does  not  examine 
objects or subjects but phenomena. Time-experience does not appear as the „object“ 
of the investigation, as the objective or subjective pole of experience but it appears in 
its own phenomenality without being an object-like conception opposing man or a 
subjective consciousness. The interpretation of time as a phenomenon refers to the 
fact that the Heideggerian investigation does not follow an objective way of putting 
10 HEIDEGGER 1975, 359.p.; 361.p. 
questions.11 So, there is a thematization of time which does not become subjective or 
objective, just understood in its own experience. 
     The Heideggerian time analyses themselves are also bipolar. Here, we also have an 
impersonal time-level which is independent from us and the personal temporality of 
our own existence, however, the two time-levels are not strongly separated but they 
have an interdependent relation. The Heidegerian thematization leads to the question 
how the physical and the spiritual time connect to each other, that is, he question of 
the historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) of human existence. Historicity somehow includes 
the  duality  of  the  time-extasies  of  existence  (Zeitlichkeit)  and  the  related  horizon 
(Temporalität), but it is not the same as the duality of objective and subjective time. 
We have to think at a different level here. The two differences are not equal but one is 
the other’s possibility condition. Time is not objective or subjective in this respect but 
it  is  both  at  the  same  time,  as  long  as  it  belongs  to  human  existence  itself. 
„Zeitlichkeit“ and „Temporalität“ is such a dinamic unity in historicity which makes 
the emerge of different aspects possible.
     Although by changing the objective-subjective sides of the traditional way both 
naturalism  and  psychologism  can  be  avoided,  compared  to  these  alternatives 
Heidegger’s viewpoint is not „neutral“ but in a certain respect „subjective“ because it 
starts from being here, the subjectum of being in the world. This, however, is not the 
same as the psychologism of subjectum-metaphysics, the psychological subjectivity 
according to which time is just a subjective mind-act. What should we mean by this 
subjectivity of time-experience? Heidegger says that if we want to liberate thinking 
from the  vicious  circle  of  opposing  viewpoints,  we have  to  redirect  the  question 
radically to the asking person. Time, in this form, belongs to the human existence 
itself. While the reflexive approach is based on the hypothesis that it is able to step 
out of the sense-happening transmitted by the time-experience chosen as its object, 
according to Heidegger, philosophy discovers time only if comprehend itself as a part 
of  it,  if   the  meditation  about  time  takes  into  account  the  temporality  of  its  own 
meditation.  We  can  only  protect  our  time-experience  from  the  thing-like 
objectivization if we don’t approach it through a reflexive way, in the frames of a 
(subjective-objective  type)  thing-onthology.  The  hermeneutic  prerequisits  of 
understanding are fulfilled exactly when we do not reflect ourselves out of time. Yet, 
it is not the crucial thing that whether we exit the circle of the temporality but whether 
we enter properly, since the positive possibility of knowing existence is hiding there. 
Thus,  from  a  hermeneutic  respect,  the  following  addition  offers  itself  :  if  we 
understand the question well, its earlier sense, the stake of the problem changes, too. 
Time no longer appears in itself but in the perspective of for us. The question will no 
longer apply to the time-question in general but to the sense of time. So, Heidegger 
claims in his lecture entitled The Concept of Time in 1924 that we cannot ask : „What 
is time?“ in itself, instead we should ask: „Am I my own time?“12
     From Heidegger’s hermeneutic perspective three fundamental meaning-layers of 
the time-concept unfold. 1. For the objective-subjective time-concepts, time appeared 
in the frame of object-experience,  belonging to identifiable time processes. But if, 
according to Heidegger, we take a look at the phenomenological feature of time, we 
can discover two more aspects: the existence in time and the temporality of being. 2. 
First of all, Heidegger sheds light on the fact that if we do not only consider time in an 
abstract way but we mean an existential event, projecting it on our own existence, 
with an attitude leading to life, then the question arises what the  existence in time 
11HEIDEGGER 1993, 419.pp.; id. 2001, 480.pp.
12 HEIDEGGER 1992, 51.p.
means from the human perspective. It is at this individually sensitive level, where the 
ability to exist, the self-identity is at stake, that Heidegger elaborates his well-known 
thanatological concept.  He intends to explore the possible ways of authentic time-
experience, which opens the way to self-being (Selbst). In his opinion, the authentic 
time,  which is able to offer new possibilities of man’s self-interpretations,  is only 
accessible through understanding man’s limits, that is, the experience of finiteness. 
The possibility of accessing time depends exactly on the degree at which man is able 
to relate to death, and this is what determines his possibility of being himself. 
     3. For Heidegger, time is a key-concept of both his human conception and his 
entire existence conception. Through the problem of temporality, he investigates the 
fact that the process of the development of selfidentity, its modification in time does 
not  explain  in  itself  the  corestructure  and  its  formation.  The  question  of  the 
constitution  of  subjectivity  isn‘t  same  as  the  problem  of  the  origin  constituting 
subjectivity. If it is not man who creates the temporality of existence but is already 
placed in this temporality, there should be a dimension of time which is the possibility 
condition of the concrete facticity. Heidegger calls time temporality (Temporalität) in 
the  function  where  it  is  not  only  the  component  of  the  actual  subjectum but  the 
„basis“  of  the  subjectivity-creation  of  human  subjectivity,  „the  apriori  of  real 
subjectivity“.13 All this makes it clear that the time-problem exceeds the boundaries of 
the  individuation-problem,  and  the  question  here  is  how  the  onthological  (or 
metaphysical) dimension, where the questions of the relation of human subjectivity to 
the  world  and  others  arise,   can  be  clarified.  In  other  words,  the  Heideggerian 
temporality concept expresses that it is not enough to explore  the question of time on 
the level of the subjectivity-theme: it cannot elaborate the sense of being only through 
the  temporality  of  existence.  For  this,  we  also  need  a  time-concept  which  is 
constituated not only by the sense-contexts carried by man, which is no longer just a 
result of an’s achievements, the „productivity of the subjectum“, but which puts the 
question of an original existence-state of experience. With the question of temporality 
we have actually reached the level of transcendence-problem, with the help of which 
Heidegger attempts to reach the heart of the schematic problem. The schematism of 
temporality  seeks  for  the  answer  to  the  transcendenc-problem.  Tracing  back  to 
schematism  does  not  mean  falling  back  into  the  psychologism  of  subjectum-
metaphysics, it is not at all about the inner, mental sphere of the subjectum. Heidegger 
is aware that it does not offer a fulfilling solution if all thinkable sense belongs to the 
circle of subjectivity.  He says that we have to show somehow that the question of 
time exceeds  the continuous argumentation  originating  from the human source.  If 
,however, time has priority over the objective-subjective differentiation, the central 
question  arises  how  the  philosopher’s  question  can  lead  it  out  of  the  circle  of 
subjectivity  as  long  as  he  looks  for  the  transcendental  possibility  conditions  of 
objectivity and subjectivity.  Can time, as temporality play the role of the ultimate 
perspective?
     Heidegger’s main problem is that even if there is such a possible concept of time, 
it  cannot  be  known.  The  horizontal  schemes  that  belong  to  the  time-extasies  of 
existence are no longer givenness because there is no such a layer of experience in 
which they can be experienced. In a strict sense, time as temporality is no longer a 
phenomenon but the condition of the phenomena which is not accessible directly and 
in  itself, yet, it appears somehow. Temporal schemes are directly not accessible, we 
can  only  gain  knowledge  about  them  through  their  effect  on  us.  Although  they 
contribute constitutively to the phenomenalization of every phenomenon, they do not 
13 HEIDEGGER 2001, 159p., 266 pp., 58p. See id. 1993, 131p., 229 p., 41 p.
fit  in  the  phenomenal  sphere,  this  is  why,  they can  no longer  phenomenalized  in 
themselves. After all, Heidegger couldn’t connect the temporal schemes to concrete 
experience.  In  this  ultimate  dimension  of  time,  Heidegger’s  entire  hermeneutic 
phenomenology is  automatically  formed.  It  remains  unanswered how the schemes 
which determine our experience can become a part of an experience-analysis. It is still 
unclear how the momentum of schematization can be expressed by experience. 
Conclusion
Thus, Heidegger’s time-analyses, simirarly to those of Kant’s, pointed out that time 
will always remain a challenge to philosophy. Although we have to put the question 
aiming at the temporal sense, meaning and purpose of being in a practical and moral 
sense,  we  cannot  give  an  ultimate,  well-established  answe  as  a  philosopher  or  a 
scientist.  In  a  philosophical  sense  the  time-problem  has  no  solution,  just  sense. 
Philosophy cannot offer a positive result in this way, its essence lies in its struggle to 
rethink things carefully and to make them more complicated. 
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